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The common law of collateral estoppel' has developed in a direction
which brings it into potential conflict with the statutory provisions
governing the effect of antitrust judgments in subsequent antitrust
suits. Section 5(a) of the Clayton Act provides that a judgment against
a defendant in a government antitrust enforcement suit shall be prima
facie evidence against that defendant in a subsequent suit by another
party.2 The presumption extends to all issues of fact and law which
were necessarily decided against the defendant in order to reach the
judgment. 3
1. The doctrine of collateral estoppel may be stated as follows:
When an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and
final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, the determi-
nation is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same
or a different claim.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973). The rationale for
the doctrine is that once a party has had a full and fair opportunity to litigate an issue
in court, he should not be allowed to relitigate that issue in a subsequent proceeding.
Bruszewski v. United States, 181 F.2d 419, 421 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 865 (1950).
2. Section 5(a) provides:
A final judgment or decree heretofore or hereafter rendered in any civil or criminal
proceeding brought by or on behalf of the United States under the antitrust laws to
the effect that a defendant has violated said laws shall be prima facie evidence
against such defendant in any action or proceeding brought by any other party
against such defendant under said laws or by the United States under section 15a
of this title, as to all matters respecting which said judgment or decree would be an
estoppel as between the parties thereto: Provided, That this section shall not apply
to consent judgments or decrees entered before any testimony has been taken or to
judgments or decrees entered in actions under section 15a of this title.
15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1970). The Clayton Act provides for three principal types of antitrust
actions. A "government enforcement action" is a criminal or equitable action brought by
the Attorney General of the United States to enforce the antitrust laws under 15 U.S.C.
§§ 4, 9, 25 (1970). (For the purposes of this Note, the term "government enforcement
action" also refers to a Federal Trade Commission proceeding brought to enforce the
antitrust laws under 15 U.S.C. § 21 (1970). See note 54 infra.) Such a suit should be
brought only when the Justice Department deems it to be in the public interest. See
pp. 555-56 infra. A "private treble damage action" is a suit by a private party brought
under § 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970), to recover damages for injuries
suffered as the result of a defendant's violation of the antitrust laws. (A private plaintiff
may also obtain injunctive relief against an antitrust violator under 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1970).
For the purposes of this Note, all private antitrust actions will be referred to as "damage"
actions.) A "government damage action" is a suit by the United States brought under
§ 4A of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15a (1970), to recover actual damages for injuries
suffered in its business or property from violations of the antitrust laws. See note 28 infra.
3. Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 340 U.S. 558, 569 (1951).
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When Congress enacted § 5(a) in 1914, a judgment in a prior anti-
trust suit could not be used to estop the defendant in a subsequent
action unless the party asserting collateral estoppel would have been
bound by the prior judgment. 4 This result followed from the judge-
made doctrine of mutuality of estoppel:
[u]nless both parties (or their privies) in a second action are
bound by a judgment in a previous case, neither party (nor his
privy) in the second action may use the prior judgment as de-
terminative of an issue in the second action.5
As a matter of due process of law, a nonparty may not be bound by a
judgment in a prior action unless he is represented by, or in privity
with, a party to that action. 6 Under the mutuality rule, then, a party
to an action will be estopped by a prior judgment only when both he
and his opponent were parties (or in privity with parties) to the prior
action.
Over the past 30 years courts have gradually abandoned the mutual-
ity rule.7 In the leading case of Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v.
University of Illinois Foundation, the Supreme Court noted the trend
away from the mutuality requirement in state and federal courts and
held unanimously that a defendant in a patent infringement suit could
estop a patentee from relitigating a patent declared invalid in a prior
4. Buckeye Powder Co. v. E.I. duPont de Nemours Powder Co., 248 U.S. 55, 63 (1918);
Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Mining and Smelting Co., 225 U.S. 111, 127 (1912);
Note, Using Government-Obtained Judgments to Prove the Conspiratorial Nature of
Subsequent Refusals to Deal: The Joker in Private Antitrust Litigation, 69 YALE L.J. 462,
463-64 (1960).
5. Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313,
320-21 (1971). For discussions of the mutuality principle, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTs § 88 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1975); lB MooR,'s FEDERAL PRACTICE ff 0.412[1] at
1801-34 (2d ed. 1974); Currie, Civil Procedure: The Tempest Brews, 53 CAL. L. REv. 25
(1965); Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9
STAN. L. Rav. 281 (1957); Semmel, Collateral Estoppel, Mutuality and Joinder of Parties,
68 COLUM. L. Rav. 1457 (1968); Note, The Impacts of Defensive and Offensive Assertion
of Collateral Estoppel by a Nonparty, 35 GEo. WASH. L. Rlv. 1010 (1967).
6. Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313,
329 (1971). But cf. Note, Collateral Estoppel of Nonparties, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1485 (1974)
(discussion of cases in which nonparties have been bound).
7. The first major case in which a court explicitly departed from the mutuality rule
was Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 812, 122 P.2d
892, 895 (1942). Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Traynor discussed the mutuality
doctrine in detail and concluded that "[n]o satisfactory rationalization has been advanced
for the requirement." Since Bernhard, numerous state and federal courts have also re-
jected the mutuality requirement. See, e.g., Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944 (2d Cir.
1964); Bruszewski v. United States, 181 F.2d 419 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 865 (1950);
Schwartz v. Public Adm'r, 24 N.Y.2d 65, 246 N.E.2d 725, 298 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1969); RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMETS § 88 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1975) (collecting cases); Note,
supra note 5, at 1017-24 nn.58-107 (1967).
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infringement suit by the patentee against another defendant.8 Some
courts have gone beyond the "defensive" use of collateral estoppel
against a plaintiff by a defendant not a party to the prior action and
allowed "offensive" use of collateral estoppel against a defendant by
a plaintiff not a party to the prior action. 9
Allowing offensive collateral estoppel against a defendant who has
lost in a prior government enforcement suit would go beyond the
prima facie presumption which § 5(a) creates.10 The government
judgment would have conclusive rather than merely prima facie effect
in a subsequent suit by another party, precluding the defendant from
relitigating any issues necessarily decided against him in the prior
suit." Allowing offensive collateral estoppel against a defendant who
has lost in a prior private treble damage suit would give conclusive
effect to the private judgment where no statutory presumption was
8. 402 U.S. 313, 320-27, 349-50 (1971). The circumstances surrounding the Blonder-
Tongue decision suggest that the Supreme Court saw the case as an opportunity to
endorse the trend away from mutuality. Blonder-Tongue overruled Triplett v. Lowell,
297 U.S. 638 (1936), which had held that a prior judgment against a patentee would not
estop him from relitigating the validity of his patent against a new defendant. In
Blonder-Tongue, the Court noted that Triplett had stood in the way of lower courts who
wished to depart from the mutuality rule, and it took the unusual step of overruling
Triplett even though both parties advocated retention of the rule in their briefs.
(The United States, appearing as amicus curiae, urged a departure from the Triplett
rule.) 402 U.S. at 318-19.
9. E.g., Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944, 954-56 (2d Cir. 1964); United States v.
United Airlines, 216 F. Supp. 709, 725-30 (E.D. Wash., Nev. 1962), aff'd as to res judicata
sub nom. United Air Lines v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379, 404-05 (9th Cir. 1964); B.R. DeWitt,
Inc. v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 225 N.E.2d 195, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596 (1967). See Blonder-Tongue
Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 329-30 & n.19 (1971);
Note, supra note 5, at 1032-37.
10. Section 5(a) deals only with the offensive use of a prior judgment against a de-
fendant in an antitrust suit by a third party. The principles advanced in Blonder-Tongue,
see note 13 infra, dearly govern the defensive use of collateral estoppel against a plaintiff
suing under the antitrust laws. Citing Blonder-Tongue, at least three courts recently have
granted summary judgment against plaintiffs in antitrust suits, on the ground that the
plaintiffs were bound by issues of law and fact decided against them in a prior action.
Poster Exch., Inc. v. National Screen Serv. Corp., 517 F.2d 117, 122-23 (5th Cir. 1975);
Scooper Dooper, Inc. v. Kraftco Corp., 494 F.2d 840, 844-45 (3d Cir. 1974); Raitport v.
Commercial Banks, 391 F. Supp. 584 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). Three other courts have suggested
in dicta that defensive collateral estoppel may be used in antitrust litigation. Interna-
tional Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 380 F. Supp. 976, 983 n.7 (M.D.N.C.
1974); In re Master Key Antitrust Litigation, 1973-2 Trade Cas. ff 74,680, at 94,979 & n.8
(D. Conn. 1973); Boshes v. General Motors Corp., 59 F.R.D. 589, 596 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
But cf. Carnivale Bag Co., Inc. v. Slide-Rite Mfg. Corp., 395 F. Supp. 287, 292 n.8
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (criticizing Boshes and Master Key for failing to recognize that a litigant
may not be estopped by a prior judgment to which he was not a party).
11. Collateral estoppel is an equitable doctrine and hence does not always preclude a
party from relitigating issues previously decided against him. A court will estop a party
if he has had a full and fair opportunity to litigate an issue, unless in the circum-
stances of the case the estoppel would not serve the interests of justice. See RESTATEIENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68.1 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973); Id. § 88 (Tent. Draft No. 2,
1975).
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created by Congress. To give conclusive effect to judgments in prior
private or government antitrust actions would permit subsequent
antitrust plaintiffs to obtain summary judgment on the issue of liability
and to recover damages on a showing of injury from the defendant's
violation.
The issue of whether offensive collateral estoppel should be allowed
in private treble damage actions has arisen in recent litigation.12 The
12. Relying on the doctrine of offensive collateral estoppel, plaintiffs have moved for
summary judgment in a number of recent private treble damage suits. In each case the
plaintiff argued that a prior judgment finding the defendant in violation of the anti-
trust laws should estop the defendant from relitigating the issue of liability. McCook v.
Standard Oil Co., 393 F. Supp. 256 (C.D. Cal. 1975); In re IBM Peripheral EDP Devices
Antitrust Litigation, No. 163 (Jud. Pan. Multidist. Litig., motion denied, Aug. 21,
1974); Levin v. IBM, No. 1173-72 (D.N.J., motion denied Jan. 17, 1974); In re Gypsum
Cases, No. 46414-A (N.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 1971) (granting partial judgment on plaintiffs'
claims of violation of Section I of Sherman Act); Purex Corp., Ltd. v. Procter & Gamble
Co., 308 F. Supp. 584 (C.D. Cal. 1970), af 'd, 453 F.2d 288 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 1065 (1972). Summary judgment was granted in Gypsum and denied in all the other
cases.
Gypsum has limited precedential value because it allowed one group of plaintiffs to as-
sert offensive collateral estoppel in a consolidated action under the Multidistrict Litigation
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1970), after another group had obtained a judgment against the
defendant. The plaintiffs had been separated into two groups at the court's direction to
facilitate trial. All the plaintiffs had participated in two years of pretrial proceedings,
and all had cases pending before the court throughout the trial which resulted in the
judgment against the defendant. In granting summary judgment to the second group of
plaintiffs on the issue of liability, the court did not even mention § 5(a) of the Clayton
Act. See In re Gypsum Cases, supra, slip op. at 1.
The IBM litigation involved the same issues of monopolization in the computer in-
dustry that were litigated in Telex Corp. v. IBM, 367 F. Supp. 258 (N.D. Okla. 1973),
rev'd in part and aff'd in part, 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1975). After Telex won a judg-
ment against IBM at trial, eight other computer companies sought partial summary
judgment against IBM on their claims. In In re IBM Peripheral EDP Devices Antitrust
Litigation, supra, the court denied the plaintiffs' motion from the bench. In Levin v.
IBM, supra, slip op. at 4, however, the court issued a written opinion which relied on
§ 5(a):
The defendant argues, and convincingly so, that Section 5 of the Clayton Act only
permits former anti-trust adjudications by the government to be given weight in
subsequent private actions .... Defendant further argues that even the government
adjudication can only be given a prima facie evidentiary value and not the conclu-
sive presumptive effect that the plaintiff urges for the Telex decision as collateral
estoppel.
In Purex Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Co., supra at 589-90, the court dismissed the
plaintiff's motion for summary judgment with the mere observation that § 5(a) governed:
According to section 5(a), the [prior decree] must be admitted in this case as prima
facie evidence ....
But application here on the principle of collateral estoppel, as urged by the plain-
tiff would mean that the [prior decree] would be conclusive as to all matters to which
it applied. The [prior decree] cannot be both prima facie and conclusive; and, it
having been determined that the statute applies, the statute must govern.
The most thorough discussion by a court of the relationship between § 5(a) and offen-
sive collateral estoppel appears in McCook v. Standard Oil Co., supra. However, McCooh
was decided on other grounds, and the court expressly reserved the question whether
§ 5(a) preempts the use of offensive collateral estoppel. 393 F. Supp. at 359.
The United States has never sought to use offensive collateral estoppel in an enforce-
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evolving common law of collateral estoppel, as established by Blonder-
Tongue and other cases, provides principles of equity and efficiency
to guide the courts in deciding the appropriate circumstances in which
mutuality of estoppel should not be required.13 But in the area of
ment suit against a defendant who had lost in a prior private treble damage action. Such
a case is conceivable (although private antitrust suits almost always follow, rather than
precede, government enforcement actions against the same defendant. See pp. 559-60
infra). For example, before Telex Corp. v. IBM, supra, was reversed, the Justice Depart-
ment amended the complaint in its enforcement suit against IBM to allege the violations
found by the trial court in Telex. Compare id. with United States v. IBM, 1975 Trade
Cas. f 60,104 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
13. At least one commentator has assumed that the Court's justifications in Blonder-
Tongue for allowing defensive collateral estoppel in patent infringement suits would
support the use of offensive collateral estoppel in antitrust actions. Note, Section 5(a) of
the Clayton Act and the Use of Collateral Estoppel by a Private Plaintiff in a Treble
Damage Action, 8 U.S.F. L. Rrv. 74, 79 & n.34 (1973). On analysis, this assumption proves
incorrect.
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice White distinguished between the use of offen-
sive and defensive collateral estoppel, noting that
the authorities have been more willing to permit a defendant in a second suit to
invoke an estoppel against a plaintiff who lost on the same claim in an earlier suit
than they have been to allow a plaintiff in the second suit to use offensively a judg-
ment obtained by a different plaintiff in a prior suit against the same defendant.
402 U.S. at 329-30 (footnote omitted). He then advanced three reasons for allowing
defensive collateral estoppel in patent infringement suits: (1) it would not frustrate the
congressional policies represented by the patent statutes; (2) it would reduce economic
costs imposed on alleged infringers; and (8) it would reduce the burden on the federal
courts from relitigation of patents once held invalid. Id. at 330-49.
This reasoning cuts against the use of offensive collateral estoppel in antitrust actions.
First, giving conclusive effect to private judgments would obstruct the congressional
policy of according government suits the primary role in enforcing the antitrust laws.
See pp. 555-63 infra. Second, permitting treble damage plaintiffs to assert collateral
estoppel in antitrust actions would impose the very type of economic costs on defendants
that the Court in Blonder-Tongue sought to avoid by permitting defendants to assert
defensive collateral estoppel in patent litigation.
Justice White pointed to the economic consequences of allowing patentees to relitigate
patents once declared invalid: "prospective defendants will often decide that paying
royalties under a license or other settlement is preferable to the costly burden of
challenging the patent." 402 U.S. at 338. Failure to give conclusive effect to a prior
determination of invalidity tended "to multiply the opportunities for holders of invalid
patents to exact licensing agreements or other settlements from alleged infringers." Id.
at 342. However, giving conclusive effect to prior antitrust judgments would increase the
coercive pressure on defendants to settle which the Court was attempting to prevent in
Blonder-Tongue. If a judgment that a defendant has violated the antitrust laws were to
have conclusive effect in every future treble damage suit against the same defendant,
many prospective defendants would be tempted to settle all but the most frivolous claims
against them, rather than risk the enormous damage liability which would result from
losing the suit. See Handler, The Shift From Substantive to Procedural Innovations in
Antitrust Suits-The Twenty-Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 COLUM. L. Rav. 1, 8-9
(1971) (threat of astronomical recovery in class action treble damage suits operates as
"legalized blackmail" to force antitrust defendants to settle even frivolous claims). Section
5(a) now induces defendants to settle government enforcement suits to avoid the prima
facie presumption given to judgments in such suits in subsequent private treble damage
actions. See p. 561 infra. Attaching a conclusive presumption to prior judgments
would make defendants even more reluctant to risk litigation. And attaching this con-
clusive presumption to private judgments is particularly apt to coerce defendants to
settle meritless claims, because private suits, unlike government enforcement suits, are
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antitrust, Congress has enacted a statute, § 5(a) of the Clayton Act, to
provide for the effect of prior judgments in a subsequent action by
another party.14 The threshold question is thus whether § 5(a) leaves
courts free to give conclusive effect to judgments obtained in govern-
ment enforcement or private actions, or whether its prima facie pre-
sumption preempts developments in the common law of collateral
estoppel. Although no reported case has thoroughly considered the
question, several commentators have asserted that § 5(a) does not pre-
clude the use of offensive collateral estoppel in antitrust actions.15
motivated by the plaintiff's economic self-interest. See pp. 555-57 infra.
Justice White characterized his final justification for estoppel-reduction of litigation-
as "an incidental matter" compared to the economic considerations on which he placed
most emphasis. 402 U.S. at 349. Moreover, this last reason does not argue strongly for
applying offensive collateral estoppel to government judgments, because such judgments
already receive prima facie effect under § 5(a), thus promoting judicial efficiency and
reducing costs to litigants. McCook v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 393 F. Supp. 256, 258
(C.D. Cal. 1975).
Hence, even absent the § 5(a) provisions for the effect of antitrust judgments, on
which the analysis of this Note relies, it is not at all clear that Blonder-Tongue compels
the use of offensive collateral estoppel in antitrust actions. Moreover, the Court in
Blonder-Tongue did not mention yet another problem with the abandonment of mu-
tuality-the effect on a party's right to jury trial. A defendant has no right to a jury trial
in a government civil enforcement action, McCook v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 393 F.
Supp. 256, 258 (C.D. Cal. 1975); 5 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRAcricE, supra note 5, 38.37[2], at
308, and estopping a defendant who has lost in a prior government enforcement suit
would prevent the defendant from trying his case to a jury in a subsequent treble
damage action. Courts have been reluctant to restrict a defendant's right to a jury trial
through the use of collateral estoppel or res judicata. E.g., Beacon Theatres v. Westover,
359 U.S. 500 (1950) (no res judicata effect to prior declaratory judgment in private anti-
trust action between identical parties); Rachal v. Hill, 435 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 403 U.S. 94 (1971) (no collateral estoppel effect to prior Securities Exchange
Commission judgment in civil action for damages against prior defendant); McCook v.
Standard Oil Co. of Cal., supra (no collateral estoppel effect to prior judgment in govern-
ment antitrust enforcement action in private treble damage suit against prior defendant).
14. Section 5(a) does not apply to the effect given a prior judgment in a subsequent
suit between the same parties (except in a government damage suit following a govern-
ment enforcement suit, see pp. 552-53 infra). See Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New
Jersey Wood Finishing Co., 381 U.S. 311, 317 (1965) (dictum). In a subsequent suit be-
tween the same parties, principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel control. See
Local 167, Teamsters v. United States, 291 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1934) (criminal prosecution
for violation of the Sherman Act followed by government suit for injunctive relief);
Florists Nationwide Tel. Delivery Network v. Florists' Tel. Delivery Ass'n, 371 F.2d 263,
270-71 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 909 (1966) (action for damages under Clayton Act
followed by action for injunctive relief) (dictum); Perryton Wholesale, Inc. v. Pioneer
Distrib. Co., 353 F.2d 618, 623 (10th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 945 (1966) (judgment
in injunctive action under the Clayton Act followed by action for damages); Boise
Cascade Int'l, Inc. v. Northern Minnesota Pulpwood Prods. Ass'n, 294 F. Supp. 1015, 1017
(D. Minn. 1968) (dictum); United States v. National City Lines, 118 F. Supp. 465, 467
(N.D. Ill. 1953); United States v. Greater N.Y. Live Poultry Chamber of Commerce, 53
F.2d 518 (S.D.N.Y. 1931).
15. Note, supra note 13, at 81-89; Note, Closing an Antitrust Loophole: Collateral
Effect for Nolo Pleas and Government Settlements, 55 VA. L. Rrv. 1334, 1345-46 & n.45
(1969). See Langsdorf, United States as Antitrust Damage Plaintiff: Mistreated Steprhild
of the Parens Patriae, 16 ANTITRUST BULL. 187, 202-12 (1971).
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This Note contends that the answer to this question lies in large
part in congressional treatment of the government damage action-a
hybrid between the government enforcement action and the private
treble damage action, in which the Government sues not to enforce
the antitrust laws in the public interest but to recover damages for
injuries suffered in its proprietary capacity from antitrust violations.10
When Congress created the government damage action in 1955, it
amended § 5 in two important ways. It provided (1) that judgments
in government enforcement actions should be prima facie evidence in
subsequent government damage actions, as they are in subsequent
private damage actions, and (2) that judgments in government damage
actions, unlike those in government enforcement actions, should not
be given prima facie effect in subsequent suits. These amendments to
§ 5, in the context of the legislative history of the section since its
original enactment in 1914 and the policy of Congress toward the
enforcement of the antitrust laws through government and private
suits, evince a congressional intent to deny conclusive effect to prior
judgments obtained in either government or private antitrust suits.
I. The Effect of Prior Government Judgments
Section 5(a) provides specifically for the effect of a prior judgment
against a defendant who has lost in a government antitrust enforce-
ment action: the judgment "shall be prima facie evidence against such
defendant in any [antitrust] action or proceeding brought by any other
party."' 7 While § 5(a) does not explicitly state that judgments in
government enforcement actions can only be given prima facie effect,
a long recognized rule of statutory construction is that the specification
of one standard implies the exclusion of all others-expressio unius est
exclusio alterius.18 Applying this rule of construction, a court would
interpret § 5(a) as prohibiting the use of offensive collateral estoppel
to give government judgments conclusive effect in subsequent suits by
16. See notes 2 supra, 28 infra.
17. 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1970).
18. E.g., Continental Casualty Co. v. United States, 314 U.S. 527, 532-33 (1942) (statute
providing that a court may remit the whole or a part of a forfeited bail bond "whenever
it appears to the court that there has been no willful default" forbids a court to exercise
any common law power of remittance it might have had prior to the statute); Knapp-
Monarch Co. v. Commissioner, 139 F.2d 863, 864 (8th Cir. 1944) ("The very fact that
Congress has provided a way in which the Internal Revenue Department may bind itself
[in an agreement as to the extent of a taxpayer's liability], precludes the possibility of its
being bound by some other procedure."); United States v. Robinson, 359 F. Supp. 52, 58-
59 (S.D. Fla. 1973) (statute providing for authorization of wiretaps by the "Attorney
General or any Assistant Attorney General specially designated by the Attorney General"
does not allow authorization by any other party).
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third parties. Indeed, during the gradual erosion of the mutuality
requirement, courts have consistently relied on § 5(a) in refusing to
give judgments in government enforcement actions conclusive effect
in subsequent private treble damage actions.", Nonetheless, the ex-
pressio unius maxim is only an aid to construction, not a rule of law.20
It could not override clear evidence that Congress intended, if common
law collateral estoppel came to provide for conclusive effect of govern-
ment judgments, that such effect should not be foreclosed.
A. Enactment of a Prima Facie Presumption in 1914
The legislative history surrounding the enactment of the Clayton
Act in 1914, taken by itself, supports the view that applying offensive
collateral estoppel to judgments obtained in government enforcement
actions would be consistent with congressional intent. The original
purpose of § 5 of the Clayton Act was to help private plaintiffs recover
treble damages for violations of the antitrust laws.21 Prior to 1914,
private antitrust actions had been few and unsuccessful, largely because
of the great cost of antitrust litigation and the inequality in financial
resources between potential plaintiffs and defendants.2 - To remedy
this situation, President Wilson proposed that private individuals in-
19. Richfield Oil Corp. v. Karseal Corp., 271 F.2d 709, 723-27 (9th Cir. 1959), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 961 (1960) (error to instruct jury that facts proved in prior government
judgment could not be rebutted by defendant); Purex Corp., Ltd. v. Procter & Gamble
Co., 308 F. Supp. 584, 589-90 (C.D. Cal. 1970), aff'd, 453 F.2d 288 (9th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 1065 (1972) (denial of offensive collateral estoppel against defendant who
lost in prior government enforcement action); Michigan -. Morton Salt Co., 259 F. Supp.
35, 64-65 (D. Minn. 1966), aff'd sub norm. Hardy Salt Co. v. Illinois, 377 F.2d 768 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 912 (1967) (dictum); Harrison v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 115
F. Supp. 312, 315, (E.D. Pa. 1953), aff'd, 211 F.2d 405 (3d Cir. 1954) (denial of plaintiff's
motion for judgment n.o.v. because prior government judgment against defendants could
not be given conclusive effect); Zuckerman v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours Co., 1953 Trade
Cas. ff 67,468 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (denial of summary judgment on basis of prior government
judgment against same defendant); Deluxe Theatre Corp. v. Balaban & Katz Corp., 95
F. Supp. 983, 986-87 (N.D. Ill. 1951) (striking paragraphs in plaintiffs' complaint alleging
prior government judgment as conclusive evidence).
20. E.g., Neuberger v. Commissioner, 311 U.S. 83, 88 (1940) (fact that Congress "has
particularized instances where partnership income retains its identity in the individual
partner's return" does not preclude such retention of identity in other instances if there
is "clear and contrary evidence of Congressional intent"); Massachusetts Trustees of E.
Gas 9- Fuel Associates v. United States, 312 F.2d 214, 220 (1st Cir. 1963), afI'd, 377 U.S. 235
(1964) (statute providing that charterers of government vessels must pay the Maritime
Commission a certain percentage of their profits does not necessarily preclude the Com-
mission from charging a higher percentage).
21. S. REP. No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1914); H.R. REP. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d
Sess. 14 (1914). See Hearings on S. 2512 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly
of the Senate Comin. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1966) [hereinafter cited as
Hearings on S. 2512 (1966)]; S. REP. No. 619, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1955).
22. Hearings on S. 2512 (1966), supra note 21, at 2-3, 61; S. REP. No. 619, supra note
21, at 3; 51 CoNu. REc. 16046 (1914); Hardy, The Evisceration of Section 5 of the Clayton
Act, 49 GEo. L.J. 44, 45-47 (1960).
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jured by violations of the antitrust laws be given "the right to found
their suits for redress upon the facts and judgments proved and
entered in suits by the Government."2 3 Congress responded the same
year with § 5 of the Clayton Act.24 The legislative history indicates
that in 1914 Congress would have given conclusive rather than prima
facie effect to government judgments but for the fear that a conclusive
presumption would be unconstitutional.2- On the basis of this legisla-
tive history, commentators have argued that Congress intended the
prima facie presumption to be the minimum effect given prior judg-
ments, not the maximum. Where the common law has evolved to give
conclusive effect to prior judgments against a defendant, the argument
continues, § 5(a) should not stand in the way.26
The crucial error in this legislative history argument, however, is
that it assumes Congress has not dealt with the § 5 presumption since
1914.27 In fact, the legislative history of § 5 did not end in 1914. In
1955 Congress amended the Clayton Act to allow the United States to
recover actual damages for injury suffered from antitrust violations. 28
23. TRuSTs AND MONOPOLIES, ADDRESS OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES BEFORE
THE JOINT SESSION OF CONGREss, H.R. Doc. No. 625, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1914).
24. Ch. 323, § 5, 38 Stat. 731 (1914) (codified in 15 U.S.C. § 16 (1970)). See H.R. REP.
No. 627, supra note 21, at 14; Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finish-
ing Co.. 381 U.S. 311, 318 (1965).
25. The House originally passed the Clayton Act with a provision that a government
judgment would "constitute against such defendant conclusive evidence of the same
facts, and be conclusive as to the same questions of law in favor of any other party." S.
REP. No. 698, supra note 21, at 57-58. See H.R. REP. No. 627, supra note 21, at 2. The
Senate Judiciary Committee thought there were "considerations of public policy which
favor the House provision of conclusiveness," but feared that denying a defendant his
day in court against a new opponent would violate his right to due process of law. S.
REP. No. 698, supra note 21, at 45. This fear dominated the Senate debates on § 5, see 51
CoNG. REC. 13851-57, 13898-901, 15824, 15938 (1914), and the Senate adopted a prima facie
presumption. After a conference committee, the House accepted the Senate version be-
cause of the same concern that a provision for conclusive effect would be unconstitu-
tional. See 51 CONG. REc. 16276 (1914); Langsdorf, supra note 15, at 206-09.
The congressional fears were unfounded. They resulted from a confusion of two
doctrines: the constitutional requirement of due process of law-that a defendant must
have his day in court before an issue is decided against him-and the judge-made
requirement of mutuality of estoppel-that unless both parties are bound by a prior
judgment, neither may use the judgment as determinative of an issue in a subsequent
action. The due process requirement is satisfied by the opportunity of the antitrust de-
fendant to litigate the issues against the Government. The rule of mutuality was never a
constitutional requirement, but only a common law rule. IB MfooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE,
supra note 5, r 0.412 at 1801-12; Langsdorf, supra note 15, at 208 n.60. See Blonder-
Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 320-27 (1971).
26. Langsdorf, supra note 15, at 206-10; Note, supra note 13, at 81-84; Note, supra
note 15, at 1346 & n.45.
27. The authors of Note, supra note 13, and Note, supra note 15, do not take into
account congressional consideration of § 5 after 1914. Although Langsdorf, supra note
15, considers subsequent congressional action on § 5, he misconstrues it. See note 37
infra.
28. Act of July 7, 1955, Pub. L. No. 137, § 1, 69 Stat. 282-83 (1955) (codified in 15
US.C. § 15a (1970)). Congress enacted § 4A of the Clayton Act in 1955 to allow the
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At the same time, Congress reenacted as § 5(a) the provision that a
government enforcement judgment would have prima facie effect in a
subsequent private treble damage action; in its reenactment, Congress
also added a provision giving a prior government enforcement judg-
ment the same prima facie effect in the newly-created government
damage action.2 9 A subsequent legislative effort to make the presump-
tion conclusive failed in 1966.
B. Congressional Consideration of a Conclusive
Presumption in 1955 and 1966
Congress reenacted the prima facie standard of § 5 in 1955 despite
specific proposals to make the presumption accorded to government
judgments conclusive. The 1955 amendments to the Clayton Act were
first introduced in 1950 as part of a bill (H.R. 7905) that would also
have changed § 5's presumption to a conclusive one."0 In that year, the
House Subcommittee on Antitrust held hearings on the desirability of
making § 5's presumption conclusive,31 and decided that the prima
facie standard should be retained. The subcommittee heard testimony
about the history of the prima facie presumption and the advantages
of changing it to a conclusive one.3 2 Witnesses testified against a con-
clusive presumption, but, unlike in 1914, no one questioned its con-
stitutionality.3 3 The committee members themselves had policy objec-
tions to the change.34 The Judiciary Committee reported out, and the
United States to recover damages when "injured in its business or property by reason of
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws." The amendment followed a Supreme Court
decision that the United States was not a "person" who could recover damages under § 4
of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970). United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600
(1941).
29. Act of July 7, 1955, Pub. L. No. 137, § 2, 69 Stat. 283 (1955). For the text of
§ 5(a), see note 2 supra.
30. H.R. 7905, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950).
31. Hearings on H.R. 7905 (H.R. 8763) Before the Subcomm. on the Study of Monop-
oly Power of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 14, pt. 5
(1950) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on H.R. 7905 (1950)].
32. Id. at 2-4, 11, 12, 18, 47, 65. The prima facie presumption of § 5 also had been
criticized in the legal literature. IV. HAMILTON &. I. TILL, ANTITRUST IN AcrioN 83 (TNEC
Monograph 16, 1940); Note, Antitrust Enforcement by Private Parties: Analysis of
Developments in the Treble Damage Suit, 61 YALE L.J. 1010, 1040 (1952); Note, Clayton
Act, Section 5: Aid to Treble Damage Suiters?, 61 YALE L.J. 417, 425-26 (1952). But see
Note, Government Antitrust Judgments as Evidence in Private Actions, 65 HARV. L. RIv.
1400, 1407 (1952) (conclusive presumption in § 5 would prolong government litigation
and help plaintiffs no more than a prima facie presumption).
33. Hearings on H.R. 7905 (1950), supra note 31, at 52-53, 89-90; See id. at 68 (state-
ment submitted to Committee). The only mention of a potential constitutional problem
is in a statement and a letter in the appendix to the printed Hearings. Id. at 89, 97. The
issue was mentioned in neither the subcommittee hearings, nor the Judiciary Committee's
Report on the bill. See H.R. REP. No. 2467, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950).
34. Committee members believed that a defendant who lost in a government suit
should have an opportunity to relitigate his case against a different opponent and
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House passed, a bill which retained the prima facie presumption. 35
The measure failed to reach the Senate floor in 1950 and was reintro-
duced in each Congress until 1955 when it became law. After the
Judiciary Committee rejected the proposal for a conclusive presump-
tion, each bill introduced to accomplish the other purposes of H.R.
7905 provided for a prima facie presumption.3" Hence the reenactment
of § 5 reflected a congressional preference for the prima facie rather
than the conclusive presumption, not a concern that the latter would
be unconstitutional.
37
In 1966, as part of a legislative effort to give presumptive effect to
nolo contendere pleas, Congress considered another proposal to make
the § 5(a) presumption conclusive. 38 The Antitrust and Monopoly Sub-
feared that a conclusive presumption would pressure businessmen to settle every govern-
ment suit by a consent decree. (The § 5 presumption does not apply to a settlement by
consent decree. 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1970). See note 79 infra; Hearings on H.R. 7905 (1950),
supra note 31, at 5-13.
35. H.R. 8763, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950). See H.R. REP. No. 2467, supra note 32; 96
CONG. REC. 10437-44 (1950).
36. See H.R. 3408, H.R. 1323, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951); H.R. 467, 83d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1953); H.R. 655, H.R. 794, H.R. 3658, H.R. 4954, 84th Cong., Ist Sess. (1955). H.R.
4954 was enacted into law in 1955. Act of July 7, 1955, Pub. L. No. 137, 69 Stat. 282 (1955).
37. When Congress enacted the prima facie standard in 1955, no question was raised
about the constitutionality of a conclusive presumption. See S. REP. No. 619, supra note
21; H.R. REP. No. 422, 84th Cong., Ist Sess. (1955); 101 CONG. REC. 5129-34, 9165-66
(1955); Hearings on H.R. 3658 Before the Subcoinrn. on the Study of Monopoly Power of
the House Judiciary Comm., 84th Cong., Ist Sess. (1955) (unpublished, portions on file
with the Yale Law Journal) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on H.R. 3658 (1955)]. (Hearings
on H.R. 3658 (1955) can be considered part of the legislative history of the 1955 amend-
ments. H.R. 3658 contained provisions identical to those in the bill ultimately enacted
(H.R. 4954); it was authored by the same Congressman (Rep. Celler) and introduced in
the same session. The hearings were held before the Antitrust Subcommittee of the
House Judiciary Committee only two months before the same committee reported H.R.
4951 to the House.)
The 1955 reenactment has special bearing on the argument that Congress made the
§ 5 presumption prima facie only because it thought a conclusive presumption would be
unconstitutional. One proponent of the argument that Congress intended the prima
facie presumption to be the minimum rather than the maximum effect given to govern-
ment judgments discusses the 1955 reenactment but misconstrues its history. Langsdorf,
supra note 15, at 209. He states that in 1914, convinced by a "tortuous line of reasoning"
that a conclusive presumption would be unconstitutional, Congress "reluctantly adopted
the prima facie evidence doctrine." He then asserts that "history repeated itself in 1955"
because H.R. 7905 had provided for a conclusive presumption (p. 550 supra) that was
inexplicably deleted when the bill was reintroduced the next year. Langsdorf, supra at
209. This analysis ignores the fact that a House subcommittee considered the merits of
H.R. 7905's conclusive presumption and reported out the bill with a prima facie standard.
See pp. 550-51 supra.
38. S. 2512, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966). The nolo contendere plea, by which a criminal
defendant neither contests nor admits his guilt, is frequently entered in criminal anti-
trust cases. The plea is particularly attractive to antitrust defendants because courts have
construed the proviso against giving prima facie effect under § 5(a) to consent decrees as
also applying to nolo contendere pleas. E.g., Burbank v. General Elec. Co., 329 F.2d 825,
830-35 (9th Cir. 1964); Twin Ports Oil Co. v. Pure Oil Co., 26 F. Supp. 366, 370-79 (D.
Minn. 1939), aff'd on other grounds, 119 F.2d 747 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 664
(1941). S. 2512 would have prevented criminal antitrust defendants from using the nolo
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committee of the Senate Judiciary Committee held hearings on the
question, and witnesses assured the Senators of both the need for and
the constitutionality of a conclusive presumption.39 But as in 1950 the
change died in committee, and once again when the bill was reintro-
duced in subsequent Congresses, a prima facie presumption was sub-
stituted for the conclusive one.
40
C. Congressional Preemption of Common Law
Collateral Estoppel in 1955
When Congress amended § 5 in 1955, it provided that a judgment
in a government enforcement suit would have only prima facie effect
in a subsequent government damage suit.4 1 In 1955, it was "well
established" that after the United States obtained a criminal or civil
judgment against a defendant, it could assert collateral estoppel against
the same defendant in a subsequent government action.42 Absent the
congressional amendment, the common law of collateral estoppel
would have given conclusive effect to government judgments in sub-
sequent government damage actions. By specifying in § 5(a) that
contendere plea to avoid the presumptive effect of § 5(a) by making such pleas conclusive
evidence in subsequent private damage actions against the same defendant. For a detailed
discussion of-S. 2512, see Note, supra note 15.
39. Hearings on S. 2512 (1966), supra note 21, at 9, 10, 16, 17, 23, 30. Courts and
commentators had continued to criticize the prima facie presumption of § 5(a) after its
reenactment in 1955. E.g., Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing
Co., 381 U.S. 311, 319 (1965); Michigan v. Morton Salt Co., 259 F. Supp. 35, 65 (D. Minn.
1966), aff'd sub. norm. Hardy Salt Co. v. Illinois, 377 F.2d 768 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 912 (1967); Loevinger, Private Action-The Strongest Pillar of Antitrust. 3 ANTITRUST
BULL. 167, 174-75 (1958); Comment, Proposed Ainendmnent to Section 5(a) of Clayton Act
Would Increase Evidentiary Aid for Subsequent Litigants, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 518, 524-27
(1964). For criticism of the prima facie standard by commentators before its reenactment,
see note 32 supra.
40. See S. 2157, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); S. 1538, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. (1967).
41. Act of July 7, 1955, Pub. L. No. 137, § 2, 69 Stat. 283 (1955) (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 16(a) (1970)) (A final judgment in a government enforcement suit "shall be
prima facie evidence against such defendant in any action or proceeding brought by
... the United States under section 4A .... ")
42. Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 340 U.S. 558, 568-69 (1951) (dictum).
See Sunshine Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 402-03 (1940) (judgment sustaining
determination by United States Bituminous Coal Commission is res judicata in sub-
sequent action by Internal Revenue Service; "[t]he crucial point is whether or not in the
earlier litigation the representative of the United States had authority to represent its
interests in a final adjudication of the issue in controversy."); United States v. Munsing-
wear, 340 U.S. 36 (1950) (judgment against United States in injunctive action for viola.
tion of price control regulation estops the Government in subsequent suit for damages
against same defendant); Local 167, Teamsters v. United States, 291 U.S. 293, 298-99
(1934) (criminal conviction under Sherman Act estops defendants in subsequent govern-
ment injunctive suit); United States v. Standard Ultramarine & Color Co., 137 F. Supp.
167, 174 n.32 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (dictum); United States v. Ben Grunstein 9: Sons Co., 127
F. Supp. 907, 911 (D.N.J. 1955) (guilty plea in criminal prosecution for violation of the
False Claims Act estops defendant in subsequent civil action by the United States to
recover damages).
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those judgments should receive prima facie effect, Congress overrode
the existing common law.
In United States v. Grinnell Corp.,4a the court held that § 5(a) bars
the use of common law collateral estoppel in a government damage
suit against a defendant who has lost in a prior government enforce-
ment suit. In that case, the United States sought damages from de-
fendants previously found liable in a Sherman Act enforcement
action. 44 The court noted that "under established common law prin-
ciples of collateral estoppel," the defendants would have been estopped
from relitigating their violation of the antitrust laws, but reasoned
from the 1955 amendment that
Congress must have meant to limit the use of an enforcement
action judgment by the United States in later damage suits by
making it no more than prima facie evidence of antitrust viola-
tions. Any other reading makes the added phrase mere surplus
verbiage, because, absent the phrase, the enforcement judgment
would have conclusive effect under the doctrine of collateral estop-
pel in a private government suit against the defendant. 45
By overriding the conclusive effect which would have been given
under existing common law collateral estoppel to government enforce-
ment judgments in subsequent government damage actions, the 1955
amendment necessarily preempted future developments in the com-
mon law. Congress intended government damage actions to function
in the same way as private damage actions,40 because the government
sues for damages not in its role as enforcer of the law but as if it
were a private plaintiff.47 The § 5(a) presumption is no exception;
43. 307 F. Supp. 1097 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
44. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 236 F. Supp. 244 (D.R.I. 1964), aff'd in part and
remanded in part, 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
45. 307 F. Supp. at 1097-98. Langsdorf, supra note 16, who criticizes the Grinnell
decision but concedes that Congress must amend § 5(a) before courts may use a govern-
ment enforcement judgment to estop a defendant in a subsequent government damage
suit. Id. at 212.
46. Where Congress intended the government damage action to be treated differently
from the private damage action, it was explicit. For example, Congress authorized the
United States to recover only actual damages rather than the treble damages a private
plaintiff may recover, because the Government does not need treble damages as an
incentie to sue. "The difference in treatment is a recognition of the difference in the
position of the United States and of 'persons' in this connection." S. RE,. No. 619, supra
note 21, at 3.
47. S. REP. No. 619, supra note 21, at 3 ("The proposed legislation, quite properly,
treats the United States solely as a buyer of goods .... "); H.R. REP. No. 422, supra note
37, at 1-5. See Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 265 (1972); International Tel. &
Tel. Corp. v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 369 F. Supp. 316, 327 (M.D.N.C. 1973); H.R.
RrP. No. 1130, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1968); S. REP. No. 454, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 6
(1967); Letter from Ramsey Clark to Emanuel Celler (Jan. 7, 1966), reprinted in S. REP.
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section 5(a) treats government and private damage actions alike.48
Given that § 5(a) preempted common law developments in collateral
estoppel which would give government enforcement judgments con-
clusive effect in subsequent government damage actions, it follows
that § 5(a) also preempted developments which would give those judg-
ments conclusive effect in subsequent private damage actions. To al-
low offensive collateral estoppel in private treble damage actions would
frustrate the congressional purpose of giving prima facie effect to judg-
ments obtained in government enforcement actions even where the
common law would give conclusive effect.
II. The Effect of Prior Private Judgments
A. Statutory Preemption: Effect of Government Damage Judgments
Even if it is established that § 5(a) precludes giving conclusive effect
to judgments obtained in government enforcement actions, the ques-
tion remains whether the statute precludes giving conclusive effect to
judgments obtained in private treble damage actions. As with the
effect of government judgments under § 5(a), preclusion would follow
from the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius: just as the
specification of the prima facie standard for government judgments
implies that only prima facie effect may be given,4 9 so the provision
for the presumptive effect of government judgments implies that only
government judgments may be given such effect. And if judgments in
private suits may not be given prima facie effect, they may not be
given conclusive effect through offensive collateral estoppel. At least
No. 454, supra at 9-11; Hearings on H.R. 3658 (1955), suin-a note 37, at 7; Hearings on
H.R. 3408 Before the Subcomnm. on Study of Monopoly Power of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 82d Cong., Ist Sess. 3 (1951) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on H.R. 3408
(1951)]; Hearings on H.R. 7905 (1950), supra note 31, at 18-20, 43, 63-65.
48. Section 5(a) makes a prior government judgment prima facie evidence in "any
action or proceeding brought by any other party . . . or by the United States" in a
government damage action. 15 U.S.C. § 16a (1970). Testifying in 1955 on a bill con-
taining provisions identical to those enacted later in the session, Stanley Barnes, head
of the Justice Department's Antitrust Division, observed that the prima facie effect
given in § 5(a) to government enforcement actions in subsequent government damage
actions
places the United States in the same category as the private litigant in relying upon
the action by the United States, not in a proprietary capacity, but in an enforcement
capacity in obtaining a judgment against a private individual.
Hearings on H.R. 3658 (1955), supra note 37, at 7. See Hardy Salt Co. v. Illinois, 377 F.2d
768, 771 (8th Cir. 1967) ("Congress in 1955 amended Section 5 of the Clayton Act . . . to
provide that final judgment or decrees in government actions under the antitrust laws
would be prima facie evidence in damage suits by the United States as well as in private
damage suits.")
49. See p. 547 supra.
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one court has refused to apply collateral estoppel to a judgment in a
private damage action on the ground that Congress wanted only judg-
ments in government enforcement suits to have presumptive effect in
subsequent antitrust actions by third parties. 0° But once again the
1955 amendments to § 5 provide even stronger evidence that Congress
intended to deny conclusive effect to private judgments.
In those amendments Congress added a proviso to § 5 which makes
the prima facie presumption inapplicable to judgments obtained in
government damage actions.51 The implications of this proviso are
straightforward. Courts cannot give conclusive effect through collateral
estoppel to judgments in government damage suits when Congress has
explicitly refused to give even prima facie effect to such judgments.
Since Congress intended that private treble damage actions and gov-
ernment damage actions be treated alike, courts similarly cannot give
conclusive effect through collateral estoppel to a judgment obtained
in a private damage suit. 2
B. Statutory Policy: Primacy of the Government Enforcement Action
The denial of prima facie effect to government damage judgments in
§ 5(a) reflects the congressional policy that government enforcement
actions should play a more important role than damage actions, whether
government or private, in enforcing the antitrust laws. Congress has
given enforcement suits this primary role because it intended that such
suits be brought only in the public interest-specifically, to preserve and
promote competition in the economy. 53 The Antitrust Division of the
50. Levin v. IBM, No. 1173-72, slip op. at 4-5 (D.N.J., Jan. 17, 1974) (denying plain-
tiff's motion for pretrial summary judgment). See note 12 supra.
51. "Provided, That this section shall not apply to . .. judgments or decrees entered
in actions under section 15a of this title." 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1970).
52. See pp. 553-54 supra.
The reasoning of Part II(A) would apply with equal force to the unlikely case in
which the Justice Department asserts offensive collateral estoppel against a defendant
who has lost in a prior private treble damage suit. See note 12 supra.
53. "The Supreme Court has said repeatedly [that] the antitrust law has its own
standard of the public interest; namely, the preservation and promotion of competi-
tion." Hearings on S. 782 Before the Senate Subcommn. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the
Senate Coinin. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 420 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Senate Consent Decree Hearings (1973)] (testimony of Professor Donald Turner, former
head of the Antitrust Division).
Of course the Antitrust Division may not always serve the public interest adequately.
But where such indications have come to the attention of Congress, it has responded with
legislation to reform Antitrust Division procedures so that the public interest will be
better served. Recently, in the wake of the controversy over the settlement of the Justice
Department suit to enjoin the ITT acquisition of the Hartford Fire Insurance Company
(United States v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 349 F. Supp. 22 (D. Conn. 1972)), Con-
gress enacted the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, which provides for judicial
supervision of Justice Department consent decrees to ensure that they are in the public
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Department of Justice54 is expected to consider the effect of a suit on
defendants, potential plaintiffs, and competitive conditions generally.5
It devises a coordinated program of antitrust enforcement,50 and its
limited resources force it to bring only those suits which will most ef-
fectively promote the goal of preserving competition.57 Congress in-
tended the private treble damage suit to supplement the Govern-
ment's enforcement effort;5 8 it never intended the treble damage
suit to be brought in the public interest. The purpose of providing
treble damages in private suits was to motivate private litigants to
interest. Pub. L. No. 93-528, §§ 2(d)(1), (2), 88 Stat. 1706 (1974) (codified in 15 U.S.C.
§ 16(e) (Supp. IV 1976)). See S. REP. No. 298, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1973); H.R. REP. No.
1463, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6-8 (1974); Hearings on S.782 Before the Subcomn. on Monopoly
and Commercial Law of the House Conin. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 35, 38,
165, 180, 190 (1973) [hereinafter cited as House Consent Decree Hearings (1973)]; Senate
Consent Decree Hearings (1973), supra at 64, 69, 147, 163. Whether or not the govern-
ment enforcement agencies actually do bring suits in the public interest, the important
point for the argument of this Note is that Congress intended them to do so, and
accordingly has given them a primary role in enforcing the antitrust laws.
54. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is the other government agency charged
with enforcing the antitrust laws. See 15 U.S.C. § 21 (1970) (FTC may issue cease and
desist orders to enforce compliance with §§ 2, 3, 7, 8 of the Clayton Act). Like the Justice
Department, the FTC is expected to bring enforcement proceedings "in the public
interest." New Jersey Wood Finishing Co. v. Minnesota Mining 9- Mfg. Co., 332 F.2d 346,
353 (1964), aff'd, 381 U.S. 311 (1965).
55. See Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, Pub. L. No. 93-528, § 2(d)(1), (2), 88
Stat. 1706 (codified in 15 U.S.C. § 16(e) (Supp. IV, 1974)) (in settling enforcement actions
by consent decree, Justice Department must consider impact of settlement upon competi-
tion, public generally, and individuals alleging specific injury from the alleged violation).
For example, the Antitrust Division attempts to ensure that a government suit will not
actually reduce competition by forcing the defendant out of business. See Address by
Baddia J. Rashid, Antitrust Division Director of Operations, Before the National Institute
on Government Antitrust Enforcement, Nov. 11, 1972, in 5 CCH TRADE REG. REP. f
50,154, at 55,263 (1975). It also uses economic analysis to evaluate the competitive impact
of possible violations, see Address by Richard W. McLaren, Northwestern University Law
School 8th Annual Corporate Counsel Institute, Oct. 8, 1969, in 5 CCH TRADE REG. REP.
ff 50,258, at 55,539-42 (1975), and it is sensitive to the larger implications of the legal
theory a court adopts in its decision. See Senate Consent Decree Hearings (1973), supra
note 53, at 194-95. Cf. H.R. REP. No. 1463, supra note 53, at 13.
56. McLaren, supra note 55. See REPORT OF ATrORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMI~lrrEE
To STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS 386 (1955) (Statement of Eugene V. Rostow).
57. Hearings on S. 2512 (1966), supra note 21, at 49; Posner, Exclusionary Practices
and the Antitrust Laws, 41 U. CHI. L. REv. 506, 523 (1974). See House Consent Decree
Hearings (1973), supra note 53, at 83; STAFF OF ANTITRUST SUnCOMst. OF THE HOUsE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY REPORT ON CONSENT DECREE PROGRAM OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 23-24 (1959) [hereinafter cited as CONSENT DECREE REPORT
(1959)]; Hearings on H.R. 3408 (1951) supra note 47, at 42.
Not all antitrust violations have an equal impact on competition, nor do all antitrust
suits. There is a continuum extending from suits which are very important to preserving
or achieving competition to those which actually result in harm to competition. See
Rashid, supra note 55.
58. Bicks, The Department of Justice and Private Treble Damage Actions, 4 ANTI-
TRUST BULL. 5, 8 (1959); Wham, Antitrust Treble Damage Suits: The Government's Chief
Aid in Enforcement, 40 A.B.A.J. 1061, 1061 (1954); Note, Fifty Years of Sherman Act
Enforcement, 49 YALE L.J. 284, 296 (1939).
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sue in their own self-interest. 59 Because damage actions bear no neces-
sary relation to the public interest, government enforcement suits
are the most important means for obtaining a rational antitrust
policy.60
The courts have long recognized the preferred position of govern-
ment enforcement suits under the antitrust laws. In 1925, the Supreme
Court denied a private party standing to enforce a decree obtained by
the Government to dissolve a combination, because the "United States
59. S. REP. No. 619, supra note 21, at 3; Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International
Parts Corp., 392 UOS. 134, 139 (1968); Lawlor v. National Screen Serv. Corp., 349 U.S. 322,
329 (1955). Courts and commentators have noted that private treble damage plaintiffs are
motivated by economic self-interest. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood
Finishing Co., 381 U.S. 311, 318 (1965); United States v. Borden Co., 347 U.S. 514, 518
(1954); Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 751-52 (1947); Renfrew,
Negotiation and Judicial Scrutiny of Settlements in Civil and Criminal Antitrust Cases,
57 CHI. B. RECoRD 130, 134 (1975). The legislative history of the 1974 Antitrust Procedures
and Penalties Act provides clear evidence that Congress recognizes the different nature
of damage suits motivated by private self-interest and government suits brought in the
public interest. See H.R. REP. No. 1463, supra note 53, at 11; S. REP. No. 298, supra note
53 at 6; House Consent Decree Hearings (1973), supra note 53, at 85; Senate Consent
Decree Hearings (1973), supra note 53, at 21, 91, 116, 134, 148, 194, 200. Despite recogni-
tion of the great importance of certain private treble damage suits, House Consent Decree
Hearings (1973), supra note 53, at 168, and suggestions that private as well as government
settlements should be regulated, Senate Consent Decree Hearings (1973), supra note 53,
at 63-64, Congress deliberately excluded private settlements from the scope of the Act,
see House Consent Decree Hearings (1973), supra note 53, at 44; 15 U.S.C. § 16 (Supp.
IV, 1974).
60. Professor Donald Turner, former head of the Antitrust Division, testified in 1973:
If you ask me are there any Supreme Court decisions that I think were wrongly
decided or were highly questionable in the last 10 years, I would say yes, and every
one of them is a private law suit.
Here is the problem: The private antitrust lawyer's job . . . is to win a case for
his client any way he can, legitimately; that is by any kind of argument he can make.
He has no inhibitions ... about trying all kinds of theories, of making use of all
kinds of past decisions, whether those past decisions made any sense or not.
His job is to get the most for his client that he can.
It seems to me that the kind of antitrust law you get out of that kind of an ap-
proach is not likely to be a highly rational antitrust law.
But the Antitrust Division at least, unlike the private plaintiffs, is not in the posi-
tion of saying to itself, "Should we file a case just because we can win it; and when
we do file a case, should we try to win it any way we can?"
A responsible Government agency does not do that. It does not bring a case that it
really thinks, as a matter of rational antitrust, should not be brought.
And when it brings the case, if it is operating properly, it does not try that case
on any kind of kooky theory that might possibly win.
-. [M]y firm belief is that for better or worse, we are much more likely to get
rational antitrust policy and rational antitrust decisions if the main laboring oar is
carried by the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission.
Senate Consent Decree Hearings (1973), supra note 53, at 194-95.
Other commentators have questioned whether private treble damage actions promote
a rational antitrust policy. E.g., Breit & Elzinga, Antitrust Enforcement and Economic
Efficiency: The Uneasy Case for Treble Damages, 17 J. LAW & EcoN. 329 (1974); Posner,
supra note 58, at 521-23, 535; Renfrew, supra note 59, at 134.
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* . .must alone speak for the public interest."' 1 This philosophy was
reiterated in United States v. Borden Co.62 In that case a federal district
court had dismissed a government suit seeking an injunction against
conduct already enjoined in a private suit. In reversing the lower court,
the Supreme Court stated:
The private-injunction action, like the treble-damage action under
§ 4 of the Act, supplements government enforcement of the anti-
trust laws; but it is the Attorney General . . .who [is] primarily
charged by Congress with the duty of protecting the public interest
under these laws. The Government seeks its injunctive remedies
on behalf of the general public; the private plaintiff . . .may be
expected to exercise [his right to an injunction] onfy when his
personal interest will be served."-
Courts have frequently denied private litigants the right to intervene
in government enforcement suits, on the ground that "the private
litigant [is] apt to confuse the public interest with his private in-
terest." 64 Courts are also less inclined to bar a government enforcement
action by res judicata than to bar a private suit, because the former is
brought in the public interest.65
The provisions in § 5(a) of the Clayton Act exemplify this broad con-
gressional purpose to rely most heavily on suits brought in the public
61. Buckeye Coal & Ry. v. Hocking Valley Ry., 269 U.S. 42, 49 (1925).
62. 347 U.S. 514 (1954).
63. 347 U.S. at 518. The Court continued with a quotation from United States v.
Bendix Home Appliances, 10 F.R.D. 73, 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1949):
"[T]he scheme of the [antitrust] statute[s] is sharply to distinguish between Govern-
ment suits, either criminal or civil, and private suits for injunctive relief or for treble
damages. Different policy considerations govern each of these."
347 U.S. at 518-19.
64. United States v. Shubert, 305 F. Supp. 1288, 1292 (S.D.N.Y. 1969):
"The government is representing the public interest and it would be destructive
of antitrust enforcement to allow a third party who has private litigation pending
against some of the parties to the consent decree to inject himself into this litiga-
tion. The government is in a better position to determine what serves the public
interest best, the private litigant being apt to confuse the public interest with his
private interest."
Id. (quoting "Judge Kaufman's memorandum opinion in this case dated March 24,
1960"). See, e.g., Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. United States, 366 U.S. 683, 689 (1961); United
States v. CIBA Corp., 50 F.R.D. 507, 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); cases cited in Handler, supra note
13, at 18 n.92. However, courts have allowed intervention when the Government fails to
represent the public interest. E.g., Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas
Co., 386 U.S. 129 (1967) (State of California had a right to intervene in settlement of
government suit), discussed in Handler, supra note 13, at 17-23; United States v. First
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 280 F. Supp. 260, 263 (E.D. Ky. 1967), affd mere. sub nom.,
Central Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 391 U.S. 469 (1968).
65. Compare United Shoe Machinery Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451, 459-60
(1922) (successive suits by Government against same defendant under Sherman and
Clayton Acts) with International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 369 F.
Supp. 316, 326-27 (M.D.N.C. 1973) (successive suits by private plaintiff against same de-
fendant for injunctive relief and damages).
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interest for effective enforcement of the antitrust laws. When Congress
enacted § 5 in 1914, nothing prevented it from giving prima facie effect
to judgments returned in private damage actions. Indeed, if the pur-
pose of § 5 were to aid private plaintiffs in any way possible, as some
commentators have suggested, 0 there would have been no reason not to
give prima facie effect to judgments obtained in private as well as
government actions. Although there had not been many successful pri-
vate damage actions prior to 1914, there had been some,67 and includ-
ing private judgments under § 5 certainly would have helped private
plaintiffs. Inclusion also would have encouraged defendants to settle
with private plaintiffs in order to avoid the prima facie presumption in
subsequent suits, just as they are now encouraged to settle with the
Government in enforcement suits.0 s Nonetheless, Congress gave private
plaintiffs the right to base their suits only on judgments in government
enforcement suits.60 Similarly, in 1955 Congress declined to give prima
facie effect to government damage judgments, recognizing that govern-
ment damage actions, like private damage actions, were not meant to be
brought in the public interestY'
The prima facie effect given to a government enforcement judgment
"magnifies" that judgment by encouraging private plaintiffs to use it to
establish their own case. In making recovery by private plaintiffs easier,
§ 5(a) increases the probability that an antitrust violation proved in a
government enforcement action will give rise to treble damage recover-
ies. 71 Those recoveries increase the penalty imposed on the violator and
66. Note, supra note 13, at 81-84; Note, supra note 15, at 1336-39.
67. See Hearings on S. 2512 (1966), supra note 21, at 180-88.
68. See Flynn, Consent Decrees in Antitrust Enforcement: Some Thoughts and Pro-
posals, 53 IowA L. REv. 983, 987 (1968); p. 561 infra.
69. While there is no clear indication why Congress gave prima facie effect only to
government judgments in 1914, the congressional debates show that the legislators were
mindful of the fact that government enforcement suits are brought in the public interest
and private damage suits are not. 51 CONG. REc. 9165, 16319 (1914) (remarks of Rep.
Floyd); id. at 13851-52, 13898 (remarks of Sen. Walsh).
70. Congress amended § 5 in 1955 to ensure that government damage actions would
not be confused with government enforcement actions for the purposes of the § 5(a)
presumption. See Hearings on H.R. 3658, supra note 37, at 7. John C. Stedman, repre-
senting the Antitrust Division, explained why prima facie effect should not attach
to damage judgments:
[I]n any event, we feel the Government suit [under § 4A] should be viewed as more
analogous to the private remedial action than to the usual civil or criminal action
brought for the benefit of the competitive economy as a whole. Consequently,
recoicry should not depend upon the fortuity of the Government's bringing or not
bringing a suit for the damages accruing to it as a Government.
Hearings on H.R. 7905 (1950), supra note 31, at 65.
71. Since the enactment of the Clayton Act, the bulk of private antitrust litigation
has followed successful Government action, so that the judgments and decrees in the
Federal proceeding could be used to establish a case.
S. Rup. No. 619, supra note 21, at 3. See Posner, A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforce-
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compensate more plaintiffs injured by the violation. By giving prima
facie effect to government enforcement judgments but not to govern-
ment or private damage judgments, Congress intended this magnifica-
tion to occur only where the violation has been established in a suit
brought in the public interest.
72
Section 5 also magnifies the influence of government enforcement
suits by providing that the statute of limitations for private antitrust
actions is tolled while a government enforcement suit is pending.
73
Like the § 5(a) presumption, the tolling provision encourages private
plaintiffs to sue in the wake of enforcement suits. A plaintiff can
benefit greatly by waiting until the end of a government enforcement
suit to commence an action against the same defendant. Government
litigation uncovers violations, collects and organizes evidence, forges
new theories of antitrust liability, and schools subsequent plaintiffs in
tested pleading and trial techniques.74 Tolling the statute of limitations
while private or government damage suits are pending would give
similar benefits to subsequent private plaintiffs and thus increase
the influence of damage suits. 75 Yet Congress has not chosen to enact a
tolling provision for the private damage suit, and in the 1955 amend-
ment, 13 J. LAW & ECON. 365, 372 (1970); Wheeler, Antitrust Treble Damage Actions: Do
They Work?, 61 CAL. L. REv. 1319, 1326 (1973); Timberlake, The Use of Government
Judgments or Decrees in Subsequent Treble Damage Actions Under the Clayton Act, 36
N.Y.U. L. REv. 991 (1961).
72. Although the Supreme Court has never decided the issue, recent lower court
decisions have held that an FTC order may be given prima facie effect under § 5(a) as a
"final judgment or decree." Purex Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 453 F.2d 288 (9th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1065 (1972) (order enforced by court of appeals); Farmington
Dowel Prods. Co. v. Forster Mfg. Co., 421 F.2d 61, 66-76 (Ist Cir. 1970) (final FTC order).
But see id. at 67 & nn.7 & 8.
73. Whenever any civil or criminal proceeding is instituted by the United States to
prevent, restrain, or punish violations of any of the antitrust laws, but not including
an action under section 15a of this title, the running of the statute of limitations in
respect of every private right of action arising under said laws and based in whole or
in part on any matter complained of in said proceeding shall be suspended during
the pendency thereof and for one year thereafter ....
15 U.S.C. § 16(i) (Supp. IV, 1974) (formerly 15 U.S.C. § 16(b) (1970)). A plaintiff who
takes advantage of this section must bring suit "within the period of suspension or within
four years after the cause of action accrued." Id.
In Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., 381 U.S. 311 (1965),
the Supreme Court held that the statute of limitations for private damage actions is
tolled during the pendency of an FTC enforcement proceeding, just as it is tolled during
a Justice Department suit.
74. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., 381 U.S. 311,
319 (1965); Hearings on H.R. 3408 (1951), supra note 47, at 5; Korman, The Antitrust
Plaintiff Following in the Government's Footsteps, 16 ViL. L. REv. 57, 70-72 (1970);
Loevinger, Handling a Plaintiff's Antitrust Damage Suit, 4 ANTITRUST BULL. 29, 38 (1959).
But cf. Hearings on S. 2512 (1966), supra note 21, at 91.
75. See Note, Antitrust Enforcement by Private Parties, supra note 33, at 1043.
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ments to § 5 it made clear that the tolling provision did not apply
to the newly-created government damage suit.7s
Congress's decision to allow private plaintiffs to benefit from govern-
ment enforcement suits but not from damage suits is consistent with
other procedural measures by which Congress has sought to enhance
the effectiveness of government enforcement suits, even at the expense
of private plaintiffs. When Congress enacted § 5 in 1914, it provided
that the prima facie effect given to government enforcement judgments
should not extend to consent decrees. 77 The Antitrust Division settles
the great majority of its suits by consent decree in order to use its
limited resources efficiently. 78 Government consent decrees are attrac-
tive to defendants because, unlike contested judgments, they are not
prima facie evidence in subsequent treble damage actions; if they were,
defendants would be much less likely to settle with the Government. 79
To give prima facie effect to consent decrees as well as to judgments in
litigated cases would help private litigants, but it would also obstruct
government enforcement of the antitrust laws. Faced with this trade-off
between efficiency of govemment enforcement and ease of private
recovery, Congress opted for government efficiency by excluding con-
sent decrees from § 5's prima facie presumption."0 Recognizing that
Congress intended the proviso to promote government antitrust en-
forcement, courts have given it an expansive interpretation.81
Congress has given government enforcement actions other impor-
tant procedural advantages over private and government damage suits
76. Act of July 7, 1955, Pub. L. No. 137, § 5(b), 69 Stat. 283 (codified in 15 U.S.C.
§ 16(i) (Supp. IV, 1974)).
77. 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1970) ("Provided, That this section shall not apply to consent
judgments or decrees entered before any testimony has been taken .... ")
78. See H.R. REP. No. 1463, supra note 53, at 6; S. REP. No. 298, supra note 53, at 5;
CONSENT DECREE REPORT (1959), supra note 57, at 7-10, 18-19; Flynn, supra note 68, at
983-84 & n.1; Posner, supra note 71, at 375.
79. Hearings on S. 2512 (1966) supra note 21, at 95; CONSENT DECREE REPORT (1959),
supra note 57, at 22-24. See H.R. REP. No. 1463, supra note 53, at 6; S. REP. No. 298,
supra note 53, at 7; CONSENT DECREE REPORT (1959), supra note 57, at ix, 303; Hearings
on S. 2512 (1966), at 15, 45; Flynn, supra note 68, at 985-87, 1003; Symposium: The
Relationship Between Government Enforcement Actions and Private Damage Actions,
37 ANTITRUST L.J. 823, 843 (1968).
80. The original House version of the Clayton Act included consent decrees under § 5.
However, once it was pointed out how this provision would affect Department of Justice
enforcement, the bill was amended. Hearings on S. 2512 (1966), supra note 21, at 78. See
H.R. REP. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 9 (1914) (Minority Report); 51 CoNG.
REC. 13,900-01 (1914).
81. Courts have interpreted the proviso making § 5 inapplicable to "consent judg-
ments or decrees" as including nolo contendere pleas in criminal suits. E.g., Twin Ports
Oil Co. v. Pure Oil Co., 26 F. Supp. 366 (D. Minn. 1939). This interpretation is not
compelled by the statutory language, but courts cite the congressional purpose of en-
couraging defendants to settle with the Department of Justice without going to trial.
Id. at 371; City of Burbank v. General Elec. Co., 329 F.2d 825, 835 (9th Cir. 1964).
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in addition to those given in § 5. The Multidistrict Litigation Act
provides for consolidation of pretrial proceedings in federal civil ac-
tions pending in different judicial districts and having one or more
common questions of fact.82 Although the legislation was designed to
cope with the problems of multidistrict antitrust litigation, " govern-
ment enforcement suits were exempted 4 because Congress feared that
allowing consolidation of enforcement suits would result in their de-
lay.sa Government damage suits, on the other hand, were specifically
included.86 Similarly, in the 1974 Antitrust Procedures and Penalties
Act, Congress provided that antitrust suits certified to be of general
public importance must be "in every way expedited" at the district
court level and may be appealed directly to the Supreme Court. How-
ever, only government enforcement suits may be so certifieds 7
The unique role which Congress has assigned to the government en-
forcement suit would be undermined by applying offensive collateral
estoppel to judgments obtained in private damage actions.88 Assuming
82. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1970).
83. H.R. REP. No. 1130, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1968); S. REP. No. 454, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. 3 (1967).
84. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(g) (1970).
85. H.R. REP. No. 1130, supra note 83, at 5; S. REP. No. 454, supra note 83, at 6.
86. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(g) (1970). In re Antibiotic Drugs, 309 F. Supp. 155 (Jud. Pain.
Multidist. Litig. 1970) (Government damage suit consolidated); McDermott, The Judicial
Panel on Multi-District Litigation, 57 F.R.D. 215 (1972).
87. 15 U.S.C. §§ 28, 29 (Supp. IV, 1974).
Congress first passed expediting legislation for government enforcement actions in 1903.
Expediting Act of 1903, ch. 544, 32 Stat. 823 (1903) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 28, 29 (1970))
(appeal from every government enforcement action "will lie only to the Supreme Cotrt";
government actions certified by Attorney General to be of general public importance to
be heard by three judge court "at earliest practicable date . . . [and] to be in every way
expedited"). The Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act amended the 1903 Act to
eliminate the use of three-judge courts to hear expedited government cases, to allow
review in the courts of appeals of district court rulings on government motions for pre-
trial injunctions, and to allow judgments in government enforcement suits to be appealed
either to a circuit court of appeals or directly to the Supreme Court. H.R. REP. No. 1463,
supra note 53, at 10-11. The expediting provisions are another example of congressional
recognition of the primacy of government enforcement suits:
The exception provided for possible direct Supreme Court post-trial review of
litigated government civil antitrust cases reflects legislative recognition of the At-
torney General's responsibilities to coordinate national antitrust enforcement policies
and the necessary discretion incident to this legislatively imposed responsibility; and,
that public antitrust cases differ in nature sufficiently from private antitrust cases
and concerns to warrant providing the Attorney General with possible direct Supreme
Court post-trial review in appropriate cases.
Id. at 11.
88. Allowing the Government to take advantage of judgments in prior private suits by
asserting offensive collateral estoppel in enforcement suits, see note 12 supra, would not
undermine the primacy of those suits. As long as government enforcement suits are
brought in the public interest, allowing estoppel would be consistent with the underlying
congressional policy of encouraging rational antitrust enforcement. Yet allowing estoppcl
might tempt the Government to bring a suit in which it could rely on a private judg-
ment, rather than a suit which would serve the public interest. Cf. Note, Appellate
Section 5(a) of the Clayton Act
that § 5(a) would permit judgments obtained in prior government en-
forcement actions to be given conclusive effect, giving judgments in
prior private suits such effect would put government and private ac-
tions on an equal footing. The congressional policy reflected in § 5(a),
however, requires that the private action remain subordinate.
But § 5(a) does not permit government judgments to be given con-
clusive effect; under the analysis presented in Part I of this Note, they
are limited to a prima facie presumption. To give conclusive effect to
private judgments but only prima facie effect to government judgments
would subordinate the government judgment to the private, thus
reversing the hierarchy of government and private suits intended by
§ 5(a). Courts may not invoke the doctrine of offensive collateral estop-
pel to bring about such a reversal without the express approval of
Congress.
Review Under the Expediting Act, 48 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 241 (1973) (discussing govern-
ment attempt to rely for discovery in enforcement suit against IBM on discovery in
private suit against IBM by Control Data Corporation). Whatever the policy considera-
tions, however, the language of § 5(a) precludes giving conclusive effect to a private
judgment even in subsequent government enforcement suits. See pp. 554-55 & n.52 supra.
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